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WHEN DID THE CONSTITUTION BECOME LAW?
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman
Abstract: Conventional wisdom and Supreme Court doctrine hold that the federal
Constitution became legally effective on March 4, 1789, when the first session of
Congress began. This conclusion is wrong, or at least seriously incomplete. Evidence
from the Constitution, its adoption, and contemporaneous understandings reflected in
treaties, statutes, and state constitutions demonstrates that the Constitution did not have a
single effective date. Instead, different parts of the Constitution took effect in stages,
beginning on June 21, 1788, when New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the
document, and continuing at least until April 30, 1789, when President Washington was
sworn into office. One must examine each provision to determine to which stage of
constitutional effectiveness it belongs. The provisions of the Constitution that limit the
power of state governments, for instance, took effect at the first stage and were therefore
enforceable law as of June 21, 1788. This understanding has potentially significant
consequences for certain litigation involving Native American land claims.

WHEN DID THE CONSTITUTION BECOME LAW?

Gary Lawson*
Guy Seidman**

Article VII of the United States Constitution declares that “[t]he Ratification of
the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this
Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”1 On June 21, 1788, New
Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the Constitution. Under the plain terms of
Article VII, that would seem to be enough to bring the Constitution into effect. States
that subsequently ratified the Constitution, with or without knowledge of New
Hampshire’s decisive action,2 were electing to join an already-existing union.
One might assume that June 21 would therefore have gone down in history as a
national holiday: the day that the nation’s governing charter became law. Neither June
21 nor the New Hampshire ratifying convention, however, have become part of the
national folklore. Nor are they even part of the specialized lore of the law. Indeed,
according to the standard legal account, the Constitution did not become effective as law
until March 4, 1789, when the first session of Congress began. The Supreme Court so
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U.S. Const. Art. VII.

Virginia ratified the Constitution on June 25, 1788 without definitively knowing of the events in New
Hampshire. See George Ticknor Curtis, History of the Origin, Formation, and Adoption of the
Constitution of the United States 578 (1865).

held in 1820 in Owings v. Speed,3 and that answer has endured as established hornbook
doctrine.4
The standard account is wrong, or at least incomplete. It is wrong across a wide
range of circumstances, including the specific circumstances at issue in Owings v. Speed.
The truth about the Constitution’s legal effect is far more complicated and nuanced than
the Supreme Court recognized in 1820, and it is long past time for that ancient error to be
corrected. Certain provisions of the Constitution, in accordance with conventional
doctrine, did not in fact become effective until the first Congress was in session, but other
provisions became law both earlier and later than that date. Provisions that require the
action of the President did not become effective until a President had been properly
elected and sworn into office on April 30, 1789. Still other provisions became legally
operative as soon as the Article VII ratification process was complete. Whether that
latter date is June 21, 1788, when the ninth state ratified the document, or July 2, 1788,
when the Confederation Congress received notification of that ratification, or some
subsequent date when the ratification was or should have been verified by Congress,
much of the Constitution became a binding legal document at some point during the
summer of 1788.

3

18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420 (1820).

4

See 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law § 43, at 400 (“The Constitution of the United States did not take
effect at once on its being ratified by the necessary number of conventions in nine states.”); 16 C.J.S.,
Constitutional Law § 35, at 107 (“The Constitution of the United States did not become operative until . . .
a day for commencing proceedings under the Constitution had been appointed by Congress”). The sparse
law review commentary that mentions the effective date of the Constitution also follows Owings without
comment. See Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 475,
556 (1995); Hans W. Baade, Time and Meaning: Notes on the Intertemporal Law of Statutory Construction
and Constitutional Interpretation, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 319, 337 n.144 (1995); Hans W. Baade, “Original
Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1001, 1003 n.5 (1991).

2

There are three reasons why it is important to know the true date(s) of the
Constitution’s legal effectiveness. First, even in the twenty-first century, it is not difficult
to imagine cases in which the effective date of the Constitution might prove dispositive.
Indeed, one such case, with enormously high stakes, occupied a great deal of judicial
attention in the 1980s. The Oneida Indian Nation sued in 1978 to recover five million
acres of land in New York that it claimed was purchased by the State of New York in
1788 through an invalid treaty. One of the plaintiffs’ many arguments was that the
Constitution eliminated any power that the ratifying states might have had under the
Confederation government to enter into treaties with Indians, and that the 1788 treaty
with New York was therefore illegal. That claim was flatly dismissed by the courts on
the strength of Owings v. Speed’s 1820 declaration that the Constitution did not become
binding law until March 4, 1789.5 While the litigation, which spanned more than ten
years, involved a wide range of substantive, jurisdictional, and procedural issues,6 it is
hard to say that Owings’ holding was entirely irrelevant to the outcome. Put more
bluntly, had the effective date of the Constitution been correctly understood two decades
ago, a substantial portion of upstate New York might have changed hands.
Second, some theories of governmental legitimacy might turn on the precise
sequence of events in the founding era, so it is important that those events be properly
5

See infra XX.

6

In all, there were four decisions on the merits, see Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. State of New
York, 520 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 691 F.2d 1070 (2d Cir. 1982), on
remand, 649 F. Supp. 420 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d. Cir. 1988); and a passel of decisions
on procedural issues. See Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin v. State of New York, 102 F.R.D. 445
(N.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying motion to intervene), rev’d, 732 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1984); Oneida of the Thames
Band v. State of New York, 102 F.R.D. 450 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (disqualifying counsel), remanded, 757 F.2d
19 (2d Cir. 1985), motion to recall mandate denied, 771 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985).

3

recorded and understood. For instance, Akhil Amar and Bruce Ackerman (along with his
sometime-co-author Neal Katyal) have engaged in an ongoing debate concerning the
legality of the adoption of the Constitution.7 Part of that debate involves the extent to
which the Articles of Confederation, which clearly required unanimous consent among
the states for any alterations, were in effect during the founding period.8 As we shall later
see, the existence of the Constitution did not necessarily preclude the continuing validity
of the Articles of Confederation,9 so the effective date of the Constitution does not
definitively resolve the status of the Articles. Nonetheless, the relationship between the
Articles and the Constitution is relevant to some important debates about theories of
interpretation and legitimacy, and the effective date of the Constitution potentially bears
on that relationship.10
Third, purely as a matter of history, there is something to be said for correcting
the record. If history books had consistently reported the year of the Norman Conquest
as 1067, and we now discovered that it actually happened in 1066,11 it probably would
not change much of consequence in the world, but one might as well get it right. This is
particularly true with something as basic as the effective date of the Constitution.

7

See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations (1997); Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the
People: Foundations (1991); Ackerman & Katyal, supra note XX, Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the
Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994); Akhil Reed
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043
(1988).
8

See, e.g., Ackerman & Katyal, supra note XX, at 539-58.

9

See supra XX.

10

We leave it to the combatants in those debates to determine whether and how it does so.

11

It would appear that much of what we “know” about the Norman Conquest is in fact error, see Frank
McLynn, 1066: The Year of the Three Battles (1999), but the date of October 14, 1066 for the Battle of
Hastings has thus far survived the test of time.

4

In Part I of this article, we set forth the correct understanding of the Constitution’s
effective date. We show that the Supreme Court grossly oversimplified the problem in
1820. Different clauses of the Constitution actually became effective at different points
in time, and certain crucial provisions, especially those limiting the power of state
governments, took effect immediately upon completion of the ninth ratification in 1788.
In Part II, we show how that understanding might have altered the course of the litigation
in the 1980s between the state of New York and the Oneida Indian Nation. We
demonstrate that the federal courts rejected the Oneida Indian Nation’s claims to land in
New York on the basis of a 1788 treaty that was invalid under a proper understanding of
the Constitution’s effective date. Part III contains brief concluding remarks.
The legal operation of the Constitution, like its adoption, was on ongoing process.
That makes it difficult to fix a precise date for celebration,12 but the loss of a potential
national holiday is a small price to pay for doctrinal and historical accuracy.

I. WHEN (AND WHOM) DID THE CONSTITUTION BIND?

A. The Birth of a Nation – Or Was It Still a Pregnancy?

On June 21, 1788, New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the United
States Constitution. The Confederation Congress received official notification of New
Hampshire’s decisive ratification on July 2, 1788 and verified the official documents

12

Or for mourning, if one thinks that the Anti-Federalists had the better of the argument.

5

shortly thereafter.13 Pursuant to Article VII, that ninth ratification was “sufficient for the
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same."14
It was, however, well understood when the Constitution was proposed for
ratification that the document was not self-executing in all respects. A Congress and a
President had to be selected in accordance with the procedures set forth in the new
Constitution. The states had to be notified of the final ratification and then had to
conduct elections for the initial members of the House, Senate, and electoral college.
There had to be a time and place established for the first meeting of the new Congress.
The electoral votes had to be cast and counted and the new President and Vice President
sworn in. Governmental officers had to be appointed. Thus, the new government could
not totally displace the government established under the Articles of Confederation
immediately upon the ninth ratification, because the new government did not yet exist.
Provisions had to be made for an orderly transition to the new constitutional regime.
The Constitutional Convention specifically requested that the Confederation
Congress provide such a transitional mechanism to effect a smooth transfer of power
from the old to the new government. The Convention’s resolution of September 17, 1787
submitted the Constitution to the Confederation Congress for transmittal to the states for

13

We have been unable to locate the precise moment at which the Confederation Congress authenticated
New Hampshire’s ratification. On July 2, 1788, the Confederation Congress referred the nine existing
ratifications to a committee “to examine the same.” 1 The Documentary History of the First Federal
Elections 1788-1790, at 29 (Merrill Jensen & Robert A. Becker, eds., 1976) [hereinafter “First Federal
Elections”]. On July 9, the congressional Committee on Putting the Constitution into Operation reported
that nine states “have duly ratified the aforesaid Constitution.” Id. at 33.

14

U.S. Const. art. VII.
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ratification15 and further asked the Congress to spell out some procedural details in the
event of successful ratification:
Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Convention, that as soon as the
Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this Constitution, the United States
in Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed
by the States which shall have ratified the same, and a Day on which the Electors
should assemble to vote for the President, and the Time and Place for
commencing Proceedings under this Constitution.16
The Congress complied with the Convention’s request on September 13, 1788 by
resolving
That the first Wednesday in January next be the day for appointing
electors in the several states which, before the said day, shall have ratified the said
Constitution; that the first Wednesday in February next be the day for the electors
to assemble in their respective states, and vote for a President: and that the first
Wednesday in March next be the time, and the present seat of Congress the place,
for commencing proceedings under the said Constitution.17
According to this resolution, the new Congress would commence its operations in New
York, the site of the Confederation Congress, on March 4, 1789.
It is interesting and significant that the Framers did not write the details of a
transitional period into Article VII. The bare text of Article VII says only that nine
ratifications are sufficient "for the Establishment of this Constitution." But the
Convention and the Confederation Congress were surely right that something more was
needed to create an operational government. The federal government could not pass
15

See First Federal Elections, supra note XX, at 6 (quoting Resolutions of the Convention Submitting the
Constitution to the Confederation Congress, 17 September 1787):
Resolved, That the preceding Constitution be laid before the United States in Congress
assembled, and that it is the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a
Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the Recommendation
of its Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting to, and
ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.

16

Id.

17

Id. at 131
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laws, appoint officials, or enter into treaties without a Congress, Senate, and President.
So was or was not the new government "Establish[ed]" on June 21, 1788? Or did the
effectiveness of the Constitution await the entrance of the new Congress on March 4,
1789, or even the swearing in of a new President on April 30, 1789?

B. The Supreme Court Speaks

The Supreme Court faced this problem squarely in 1820 in the little-known case
of Owings v. Speed.18 In 1785, the Commonwealth of Virginia granted a patent for 1000
acres of land to John C. Owings and another landowner. On December 2, 1788, the
Virginia legislature passed a statute vesting 100 acres of the Owings tract in a set of
trustees for the establishment of a new town.19 Owings subsequently brought an
ejectment action against lessees of the former Owings property, claiming that the statute
vesting the Owings parcel in the trustees violated the Contracts Clause of the
Constitution20 by impairing the contract represented by the land patent.21 The Supreme
Court, per Chief Justice Marshall, held that the Constitution, and therefore the Contracts
Clause, was not operative in 1788 when the Virginia legislature passed the statute
18

18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420 (1820).

19

See Act of Dec. 2, 1788, ch. LX, 1788 Va. Acts. The statute made reference to the tract vested in “John
C. Owing.” All of the records in the Supreme Court, however, used the name “Owings.” We assume in
this article (for no reason that we can defend) that the lawyers in the case spelled Owings’(?) name
correctly.
20

U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts").

21

Owing could not, of course, raise any claims under the federal Constitution for the taking of property
without just compensation, because there was clearly no provision in the original constitutional text barring
state takings of property.

8

divesting Owings of his property. After recounting the actions of the Constitutional
Convention and the Confederation Congress concerning implementation of the new
Constitution,22 Marshall declared:
Both Governments [i.e., the old Confederation government and the new
constitutional government] could not be understood to exist at the same time. The
new Government did not commence until the old Government expired. It is
apparent that the Government did not commence on the Constitution being
ratified by the ninth State; for these ratifications were to be reported to Congress,
whose continuing existence was recognized by the Convention, and who were
requested to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose of bringing the new
government into operation. In fact, Congress did continue to act as a government
until it dissolved on the first of November, by the successive disappearance of its
members. It existed potentially until the 2d of March, the day preceding that on
which the members of the new Congress were directed to assemble.23
In fact, as Marshall acknowledged, because Article I, section 7 makes presentment to the
President a prerequisite for the enactment of valid laws,24 the new government could not
truly be fully operative until a President was selected and sworn in,25 which would make
the effective date of the new constitutional government April 30, 1789. But whether one
views March 4, 1789 or April 30, 1789 as the magic moment for the effectiveness of the
Constitution, the Virginia statute of December 2, 1788 was enacted before the
Constitution took effect, and Owings therefore lost. So, at least, the Court held.
It is virtually certain that Owings was wrongly decided. But determining
precisely in what respect Owings was wrong proves to be a complicated task.

22

Marshall’s recounting left much to be desired. Marshall incorrectly fixed the date of assembly of the
first Congress as March 3, 1789; it was actually March 4. And he dated the September 13, 1787
implementing resolution of the Confederation Congress as “in September or October, 1788.” 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) at 422).

23

18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 422.

24

U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.

25

See 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 422-23.
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C. A Multi-Tiered Theory of Constitutional Effectiveness
An originalist might be tempted to say that if the Framers meant to delay the
effective date of the new government beyond the moment of the ninth ratification, they
could (and should) have said so in the text of the Constitution instead of issuing
resolutions from the Convention on the side. If the Constitution does not take effect
immediately upon ratification, this argument runs, then what sense does it make to say, in
Article VII, that the Constitution is "Establish[ed]" by the necessary ratifications? The
only question, on this view, is when “Ratification” of the Constitution pursuant to Article
VII took place. Was it when the ninth state completed its vote, when that ninth vote was
received (or certified) by the Confederation Congress, or possibly even when notice of
that certification was given to the state governments? In any event, on this analysis the
Constitution must have gone into effect sometime in June or July 1788.
On the other hand, one could equally say, with Chief Justice Marshall, that the
Framers did not need to state the obvious: that the Constitution, even once ratified, was
not self-executing. As Marshall noted, and as the Convention recognized, the machinery
of governance had to be put into place before the new national government could
function. And rather than constitutionalize the specific dates of transition, the
Convention left it to the Confederation Congress to determine the transitional timetable.
One could argue that just as treaties between nations are not necessarily self-executing,
and thus do not necessarily create enforceable rights and obligations simply by virtue of

10

their formal ratification,26 so the Constitution, a "treaty" of sorts among states and people,
did not create legal rights and obligations simply by virtue of formal ratification.
Furthermore, one might continue, this position does not render the term "Establishment"
in Article VII meaningless. Once the necessary nine ratifications were made, no state
could then undo what had already been done: the Constitution was now "in place,"
awaiting only its full implementation. Before the ninth ratification took place,
presumably any ratifying state could undo its ratification.27 The "Establishment" of the
Constitution under Article VII, however, took away that freedom and made the
Constitution part of the legal landscape, even if that landscape continued to include the
Articles of Confederation as well until the machinery of the new government was fully
(for want of a better term) established.
Both of these positions are partially right but seriously wrong. Each assumes, as
did Marshall in Owings, that the Constitution must be operative or not as a whole.
Perhaps, however, the Constitution becomes operative in stages, so that different portions
of the document create rights and obligations at different points in time. For instance,
one could say that the provisions of the Constitution that require legislative and
presidential action -- and this includes some of the most important provisions -- could not
be fully "in effect" until all of the executory steps necessary for their establishment had
taken place. The national government could not pass laws, make treaties, or appoint

26

See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original
Understanding, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (1999); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual
and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2218 (1999).
27

Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twentyseventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 683 (1993) (arguing that Congress and the States may revoke
proposals or ratifications of constitutional amendments until, but not after, the necessary three-quarters of
the States have ratified).
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officers until the Congress and the President were, both formally and functionally, in
office. These provisions thus did not become legally operative until April 30, 1789.
Other provisions that require only unilateral congressional action might, on this
argument, have become effective on March 4, 1789; these provisions would include such
matters as the selection of legislative officers,28 the establishment of legislative
procedures,29 and the discipline of members of Congress.30 Still other provisions,
however, do not require any legislative or executive machinery to make them operative.
These provisions could meaningfully be "in effect" at some earlier time, such as the
moment of ratification. The Contracts Clause appears to be precisely the kind of
provision that is self-executing in this respect. No federal legislative or presidential
action is needed in order to implement its prohibition on certain kinds of state laws. The
Supremacy Clause ensures that state courts must give legal effect to the Contracts Clause
even if no federal judges are in office. Indeed, the Constitution’s few prohibitions on
states were presumably designed to prevent major evils (in order to justify the
extraordinary step of limiting the powers of states), so this is a context in which the norm
might be thought to operate at the soonest possible time. One could therefore agree with
Marshall that some of the Constitution's provisions did not take effect until March or
April 1789, but still maintain that Owings should have won his case because the
Contracts Clause was effective upon ratification.
28

The Constitution empowers the House to “chuse their Speaker and other Officers.” U.S. Const. art. I, §
2, cl. 5. The Vice President is declared to be the President of the Senate, see id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4, but the
Senate is empowered to “chuse their other Officers.” Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
29

See id. art. I, § 5, cls. 2-3 (empowering each House to determine its rules of proceeding and to keep a
journal).
30

See id. art. I, § 5, cls. 1-2 (empowering each House to discipline, expel, and determine the qualifications
of its members).
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This "multi-tiered" theory of constitutional effectiveness must be correct, for a
host of reasons involving the implementation of the new Constitution and the founding
generation’s understanding of analogous legal documents.

1. Lessons from the Founding

Go back to the actions of the Convention and the Confederation Congress in
implementing the new Constitution. Many of the formalities necessary to carry the
Constitution into effect were directly specified in the text of the Constitution. The
Constitution itself prescribed the qualifications for electors for the House and Senate,31
and the states were empowered to set their own times and places for congressional
elections.32 Thus, the states could provide entirely for the election of members of the
new Congress without any help from the Confederation Congress. Accordingly, the
Convention did not request, and the Confederation Congress did not provide, any
machinery for implementing the constitutional directives on congressional elections.
There were two important matters, however, in which the intervention of the
Confederation Congress was necessary. First, the Constitution specifically provided that
the date for the meeting of the electoral college “shall be the same throughout the United

31

For the house, “the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature,” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 1, and the senators from each state
were (until the seventeenth amendment) “chosen by the Legislature thereof.” Id. Art. I, § 3, cl. 1.

32

See id. Art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”).
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States,”33 but did not fix a specific date (such as, for example, “six months after
ratification”). Perhaps it would have been possible for the states to agree among
themselves on a uniform date for presidential election through some vehicle other than
the Confederation Congress, but the pre-existing Congress was the obvious locus for that
choice. Second, the Constitution did not specify a location for the new government in the
interim period before a seat of government could be established under the District
Clause.34 Accordingly, the sole subjects on which the Convention sought action by
Congress concerned the selection of presidential electors (and the subsequent counting of
electoral votes) and the specification of a location for the first meeting of the new
government.35 And the sole subjects on which the Congress legislated for the operation
of the new government concerned presidential elections and the selection of a site for the
government.

33

Id. Art. II, § 1, cl. 3. The full sentence reads: “The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the
Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their votes, which Day shall be the same throughout the
United States.”

34

See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (giving Congress power “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States,
and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States”).
35

The full text of the relevant Convention resolution read:
Resolved, that it is the opinion of this Convention, that as soon as the Conventions of
nine States, shall have ratified this Constitution, the Unitd States in Congress assembled should fix
a day on which Electors should be appointed by the State which shall have ratified the same, and a
day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and the time and place for
commencing proceedings under this Constitution. That after such publication the Electors should
be appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: That the Electors should meet on the
day fixed for the Election of the President, and should transmit their votes certified, signed, sealed
and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress
assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the tiem and place assigned;
that the Senators should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole purpose of receiving,
opening and counting the votes for President; and, that after he shall be chosen, the Congress,
together with the President, should, without delay, proceed to execute this Constitution.

1 First Federal Elections, supra note XX, at 6-7.
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The critical assumption underlying this whole procedure was that the
constitutional provisions that did not require any federal legislative (or executive) action
were fully effective from the moment of ratification (however that is ultimately defined).
The provisions concerning the mechanisms for electing members of Congress and
presidential electors were assumed by everyone to be in full force. As illustrated above,
this was the unchallenged, operative assumption of the Convention and the Confederation
Congress. There was substantial debate in the Confederation Congress about the proper
location of the seat of government, but none at all concerning whether the Congress
should, for example, specify a mode of selecting presidential electors; everyone
understood that the selection of electors (though not the time of their meeting) was left to
the states by the now-operative Constitution.36 This was also the unchallenged
assumption in the states following ratification of the Constitution. For example, on
September 27, 1788, Governor Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina issued a
proclamation in the wake of the election ordinance of the Confederation Congress. After
reciting the text of that ordinance, Governor Pinckney declared:
And whereas the times places and manner of holding elections for senators and
representatives under the constitution of the United States are to be prescribed in
each state by the legislature thereof I do therefore issue this proclamation giving
authentic information of the above act of Congress as an additional inducement to
the punctual attendance of the members of the legislature on the seventh day of
October next being the day to which they stand adjourned.37
This clearly assumes that the Constitution’s provisions concerning the staffing of the new
government were in full effect long before March 4, 1789. We know of nothing in any

36

See id. at 23-143 (detailing the debates concerning the Confederation Congress’ election ordinance of
September 13, 1788).
37

Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
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state’s proceedings during the founding period that called this assumption into question.
Accordingly, the evidence is overwhelming that at least some parts of the Constitution –
which did not require implementation by the new federal legislature and executive – were
in effect immediately upon ratification.

2. Lessons from the Law

This view of immediate legal operation of (at least part of) the Constitution is
consistent with general eighteenth-century norms concerning the effective date of
governmental instruments. There were three kinds of public governmental instruments
with which the framing generation was familiar: treaties, state constitutions, and
statutes.38 All three kinds of instruments were clearly understood presumptively to
operate from their moment of effectiveness. Just as importantly, all three kinds of
instruments were understood to be capable of taking effect in stages, with different
provisions generating legal effects at different times.

a.

Treaties

38

Governments execute many other kinds of instruments, such as licenses, charters, land patents, and
contracts, but they pertain more to private than to public law. In any event, all of these instruments as well
are effective from the moment of issuance (though one can argue about precisely what events are necessary
for “issuance” -- as in the case, to pick a random example, of a commission of appointment to a
government post). Indeed, we have been unable to think of an instrument that is not presumptively
effective from the moment of execution.

16

Treaties have long been understood to operate from the moment of their
ratification.39 The Supreme Court expressed the correct founding-era rule in 1850 when
it observed, “In the construction of treaties, the same rules which govern other compacts
properly apply. They must be considered as binding from the period of their execution;
their operation must be understood to take effect from that period, unless it shall, by some
condition or stipulation in the compact itself, be postponed.”40
This rule of immediate effectiveness is graphically illustrated by the traditional
practices of nations concerning such matters as the termination of war.41 Suppose that
two governments complete all of the necessary formalities for ratification of a treaty of
peace. The peace cannot be an effective reality until the troops engaged in combat are
informed of the treaty’s ratification and lay down their arms. In a pre-modern era without
near-instantaneous forms of communication, the process of notification to the belligerent
forces could take weeks or months. If the ratification of the treaty truly “ends” the war
for legal purposes, then those belligerent forces are engaged in (at the very least) tortious
acts if they continue fighting, even if they have no means of knowing that the war is over.
Despite this somewhat jarring consequence, international law traditionally deemed the
treaty effective immediately upon ratification. The drafters of the treaty were left to deal
with the potential liability of unwitting combatants once the war ends. As we have
elsewhere written:
39

This does not mean that all treaties are necessarily self-executing. See supra note XX. But to the extent
that treaties have independent legal force, that force radiates from the moment of ratification.
40

United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 127, 148 (1850).
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The ensuing discussion is drawn from a number of sources, including T. Baty & J. H. Morgan, War:
Its Conduct and Legal Results 398 (1915); William Edward Hall, International Law 482-95 (J.B.
Atlay ed., Oxford 5th ed. 1904); and Coleman Phillipson, Termination of War and Treaties of Peace
185-98, 214-17 (1916).
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A well-drafted treaty will include realistic timetables for notification and
withdrawal of troops and will contain provisions for immunizing the soldiers and
their governments from liability for damage inflicted before news of the peace can
reach them; perhaps it will also contain provisions for compensation to the
citizens and governments that suffer such damage. The end of the “war,” in the
extended sense that includes the post-treaty period of transition, will thus
normally be determined by reference to the treaty.42
This scheme assumes that treaties take legal effect immediately upon ratification. If the
contracting states want to delay the legal effectiveness of some portion of the treaty, they
need to say so.
It is commonplace, however, for different parts of the treaty to take effect at
different times. In treaties that end a war of occupation, for instance, the provisions that
transfer sovereignty to the conqueror can take effect immediately, 43 while provisions that
deal with the ending of actual hostilities, the notification to combatting troops of the
war’s end, and the withdrawal of troops from the transferred territory might take place on
a very different schedule. All parts of the instrument need not take effect at the same
time.
For an illustration, one need look no further than the Jay Treaty of 1794 that
formalized the peace between the United States and Great Britain.44 The vast bulk of the
Treaty, involving matters such as borders, navigation, property, and trade, was obviously
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Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing without Authority, 95 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 581, 605 (2001).
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We have elsewhere discussed at some length how treaties that transfer control or sovereignty of territory
from one nation to another generally take effect immediately upon completion of the necessary
ratifications. See id. at 604-07.
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For a similar analysis of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that terminated the Mexican-American War,
see id. at 605-06.
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designed to go into immediate operation, but Article II specified a delayed timetable for
the withdrawal of British troops:
His Majesty will withdraw all his troops and garrisons from all posts and
places within the boundary lines assigned by the treaty of peace to the United
States. This evacuation shall take place on or before the first day of June, one
thousand seven hundred and ninety-six, and all the proper measures shall in the
interval be taken by concert between the Government of the United States and His
Majesty’s Governor-General in America, for settling the previous arrangements
which may be necessary respecting the delivery of the said posts . . . .45
In sum, treaties operate from the moment of their ratification unless the treaty
itself provides a different effective date, and different provisions of the treaty can take
effect at different points in time.

b. State Constitutions

Another useful analogue to the federal Constitution is the impressive set of state
constitutions that was already in place in 1787. These documents were in large measure
models for the drafting of the federal Constitution and formed an essential part of the
legal background against which the Constitution was written and ratified.46 “Many at the
Constitutional Convention in 1787 had assisted in the writing of state constitutions.”47
We do not want to make too much of what is found in these state constitutions.
The early models, in particular, were experiments in drafting that explored a fair amount
of uncharted territory. The drafters and ratifiers of these constitutions did not always
45

Treaty with Great Britain, Nov. 19, 1794, Art. II.
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See Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism 2 (1988) (noting that state
constitutions are “[r]eferred to directly or by implication more than fifty times in forty-two sections of the
U.S. Constitution”).
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Id. at 12.
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have a clear picture of what they were doing, or even of what they were trying to do, and
they certainly did not have the luxury of long reflection on deep questions of political
theory. Nonetheless, much of what happened with these state constitutions confirms the
basic propositions about legal effectiveness gleaned from a study of treaties.
The drafters of state constitutions prior to and contemporaneous with the adoption
of the federal Constitution were keenly aware of the baseline rule of immediate legal
effectiveness, and they often took great care to accommodate that principle when making
provision for a transfer of power from one government to the next. The most direct
solution was provided by the Georgia Constitution of 1789, which declared that “[t]his
constitution shall take effect, and be in full force, on the first Monday in October next,
after the adoption of the same . . . .”48 By specifically delaying the effective date of
operation of the constitution, the Georgia drafters evidently recognized that in the
absence of any such provision, the constitution would take immediate effect. The delay
in operation permitted the existing institutions to continue until the new government was
in place.
We admit that this interpretation of the Georgia constitution is not inevitable. It is
possible that the specified date was understood to replace some different date that would
otherwise govern, such as “whenever it is reasonable for the pre-existing institutions to
terminate.” That is, perhaps the specified date was designed to advance rather than delay
the effective date of the Georgia constitution by mandating that the new institutions
appear at a set time. In order for this to be a plausible hypothesis, however, one must
identify the background rule, other than immediate effectiveness, that the Georgia

48

Ga. Const. of 1789 art. IV, § 8.
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constitution was displacing. It is possible to invent such rules (as we have done in this
paragraph), but we are aware of nothing that would single out any such rule as a good
candidate. The only background rule that had any currency, and therefore the only
background rule that the constitution’s drafters might reasonably seek to avoid, was the
rule of immediate effectiveness.
North Carolina had a similarly direct solution to the problem of transition. The
North Carolina Constitution of 1776 stated, in a brief coda following the last numbered
article, that “[t]his Constitution is not intended to preclude the present Congress
[operating under the colonial charter] from making a temporary provision, for the well
ordering of this State, until the General Assembly shall establish a government, agreeable
to the mode herein before described.”49 Again, the clear underlying assumption is that
the constitution takes effect immediately upon adoption unless the document states
otherwise. Instead of specifying a particular date of operation, as did the Georgia
Constitution of 1789, the North Carolina drafters gave authority to the pre-existing
government to implement the transition. Thus, the effective date of the constitution was
not strictly delayed; the constitution simply empowered existing institutions to continue
in effect for some time. The distinction is important, because those provisions that did
not require any period of transition, such as the bill of rights, were presumably operative
from the moment of adoption.50 That is the difference between the Georgia approach,
which straightforwardly delays the effectiveness of the constitution, and the North
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N.C. Const. of 1776 ------.
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We have to say “presumably,” because we have not been able to find a case, in any of the original
states, that squarely presents the point.
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Carolina approach, which allows the constitution to take immediate effect but provides
for transitional mechanisms.
Georgia, as far as we can tell, was the only state that flatly delayed the effective
date of its constitution. The other states all provided some kind of transitional device.
One common approach was to make express provision for the continuance in office of
existing public officials until the machinery of their new governments was operative. For
instance, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided:
To the end there may be no failure of justice, or danger arise to the
commonwealth from a change in the form of government, all officers, civil and
military, holding commissions under the government and people of Massachusetts
Bay in New England, and all other officers of the said government and people, at
the time this constitution shall take effect, shall have, hold, use, exercise, and
enjoy, all the powers and authority to them granted or committed, until other
persons shall be appointed in their stead; and all courts of law shall proceed in the
execution of the business of their respective departments; and all the executive
and legislative officers, bodies, and powers shall continue in full force, in the
enjoyment and exercise of all their trusts, employments, and authority; until the
general court, and the supreme and executive officers under this constitution, are
designated and invested with their respective trusts, powers, and authority.51
The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 similarly provided:
To the end that there may be no failure of justice or danger arise to this
state from a change in the form of government, all civil and military officers,
holding commissions under the government and people of New Hampshire, and
other officers of the said government and people, at the time this constitution shall
take effect,shall hold, exercise and enjoy all the powers and authorities to them
granted and committed, until other persons shall be appointed in their stead.52
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 contained elaborate provisions for the
continuation in office of the existing authorities:
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Mass. Const. of 1780 art. IX.
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N.H. Const. of 1784 -----.
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That no inconvenience may arise from the alterations and amendments in
the constitution of this commonwealth, and in order to carry the same into
complete operation, it is hereby declared and ordained:
....
That the president and supreme executive council shall continue to
exercise the executive authority of this commonwealth, as heretofore, until the
third Tuesday of December next; but no intermediate vacancies in the council
shall be supplied by new elections.
That all officers in the appointment of the executive department shall
continue in the exercise of the duties of their respective offices until the first day
of September, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, unless their
commissions shall sooner expire by their own limitations, or the said offices
become vacant by death or resignation, and no longer, unless reappointed and
commissioned by the governor; except that the judges of the supreme court shall
hold their offices for the terms in their commissions respectively expressed.
That justice shall be administered in the several counties of the State, until
the period aforesaid, by the same justices, in the same courts, and in the same
manner as heretofore.53
The Delaware Constitution of 1776, the South Carolina Constitution of 1778, and the
Virginia Constitution of 1776 also expressly provided for the continuation in office of
various officials until elections were held under the new constitutions.54 All of these
provisions made sense only on the assumption that pre-existing governmental institutions
had authority only to the extent that such authority was recognized by the new
constitutions. And that, in turn, assumes that the new constitutions were, to the extent
possible, operative from the moment of their adoption.
As in the case of North Carolina, this approach of “granting a continuance” to
pre-existing institutions presumably has the effect of allowing provisions that do not
require transitional mechanisms, such as bills of rights and selection procedures for the
new government, to take effect immediately.55 Other provisions that require action by
53

Pa. Const. of 1790 Schedule §§ 2-4.
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Del. Const. of 1776 art. 27; S.C. Const. of 1778 art. II; Va. Const. of 1776 ¶¶ -----.
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As noted above, see supra note XX, we must base this conclusion on inference rather than authority.
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officials under the new government cannot, of course, take effect until those officials are
in place. Thus, the notion of a constitution that becomes operative in stages was familiar,
at least in structure, from the models of state constitutions that were available in the late
eighteenth century.
A number of states expressly recognized that pre-existing laws had to be in some
sense ratified by the new constitutions. A good illustration is article XXI of the New
Jersey Constitution of 1776:
[A]ll the laws of this Province . . . shall be and remain in full force, until altered
by the legislature of this Colony (such only excepted, as are incompatible with
this Charter) and shall be, according as heretofore, regarded in all respects, by all
civil officers, and others, the good people of this Province.56
Not only does this provision reflect the view that the old laws would expire unless
reaffirmed by the new constitution, but the clause stating that laws “incompatible with
this Charter” do not survive again shows how the document was understood to operate
from the moment of its adoption.
In states like New Jersey that did not expressly provide for the continuation in
office of pre-constitutional authorities, did the rule of immediate operation
instantaneously wipe out the existing governmental authorities, even before the new
institutions were in place? The answer is obviously no, and it can be reached through
several lines of reasoning. First, one could say that a reference to “all the laws” that
remain in effect under the new constitution includes laws concerning governmental
structure. Those laws would thus continue in effect until displaced by action of the
existing authorities pursuant to the new constitution. Second, one could say that the
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N.J. Const. of 1776 art. XXI. See also Mass. Const. of 1780 --- art. VI; N.Y. Const. of 1777 art.
XXXV; S.C. Const. of 1776 art. XXIX.
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continuation of the existing authorities was implicit in the new constitution, even without
an express provision preserving their authority. Obviously, an express provision would
be preferable, as some of these states ultimately realized,57 but it would not be bizarre to
say that the new constitution implicitly retained the existing governmental institutions
until their replacements had taken office. But under any of these understandings, some
parts of the constitutions became immediately effective, while others had to await the
transition to the new regime to become fully effective.
To be fair, not every early state constitution demonstrated the same level of care
about the details of transition. The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, as noted, paid
acute attention to these matters, but the New Hampshire Constitution of 1776 said only
that the existing legislators “assume the name, power and authority of a house of
Representatives or Assembly.”58 The 1789 Georgia Constitution specified an effective
date for the instrument, but the 1777 state constitution merely set a date for the election
of legislators and county officers.59 And while the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790
had one of the most complete transition schedules to be found in any early constitution,
the state’s 1776 constitution merely maintained the existing legislature by implication.60
Nonetheless, the overwhelming message from the state constitutions, and particularly
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1777, Plan or Frame of Government § VIII.
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from the constitutions that were framed after the intial wave of adoptions in 1776-77,61 is
that eighteenth-century constitution-makers were keenly aware that such documents took
effect upon adoption. One can fairly say that by 1789, it was the clear understanding in
the states that constitutions presumptively take effect immediately upon their adoption.62
It was just as clear that constitutions could take effect in stages: some provisions could
take effect at once, while others awaited transitional action by the pre-existing authorities.

c.

Statutes

The same rule concerning effectiveness applied to statutes. It has long been
settled that statutes take effect on the day of their enactment unless the statute itself
specifies a different time.63 The First Congress under the Constitution evidently shared
this view. That Congress knew how to prescribe an effective date later than the date of
enactment: the second statute of the First Congress, which imposed various customs
duties, delayed the effective date of the tariffs by periods ranging from four weeks to
sixteen months.64 Significantly, the Congress had no problem with the idea that different
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On the different stages, or “waves,” of state constitutional development, see Lutz, supra note XX, at
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parts of the statute would take effect at different times, as reflected in the (widely)
differential periods of delay for different tariffs.
The government’s other early statutes, however, including the federal
government's first major criminal enactment containing such matters as a provision
imposing the death penalty for counterfeiting federal securities,65 specified no effective
date, meaning that the legislature must have intended the date of enactment to serve as
the effective date.
But could they really have meant this? Suppose that on April 30, 1790, the
federal legislature enacts a criminal statute prescribing the death penalty for knowingly
passing counterfeit federal securities. On May 1, 1790, a person in Georgia commits an
act that falls within the terms of the statute. The conduct occurs after enactment of the
statute, but there is no way in 1790 that news of the enactment could have reached every
recess of Georgia by the next day. It was therefore metaphysically impossible for the
defendant to have learned of the statute before committing the acts. Can that person
lawfully be sent to the gallows?66
Although it may jar modern sensibilities, the answer – or at least the eighteenthcentury answer -- is almost surely yes. The Constitution does exhibit a measure of
concern for notice of the law. The Constitution flatly prohibits either the states or the
federal government from passing ex post facto laws67 – that is, laws that punish conduct
that was legal at the time that the conduct occurred. But that goes only to the problem of
65
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retroactive criminalization.68 It does not reach the problem of communication: the
necessity of a time lag between enactment of a law and its promulgation to the affected
public. It is quite clear that the ex post facto clauses do not address this latter issue. State
constitutions prior to 1789 often contained provisions prohibiting ex post facto laws, and
those provisions uniformly and expressly referred only to statutes that sought to punish
conduct that took place before the statutes came into existence.69 A law does not become
“ex post facto” simply because one does not, and cannot, have knowledge of its
enactment.
Nor do notions of due process impose a constitutional “waiting period” on the
effectiveness of statutes.70 As noted above, the clear tradition, reflected in early statutory
and decisional law, treated immediate effectiveness of even criminal laws as the
accepted, and acceptable, norm. The English practice was even harsher. Until an
enactment of 1793 made the date of the King’s assent to a statute the standard
commencement date for the statute’s operation, the rule was that statutes were deemed to
relate back to the first day of the session in which they were passed.71 The American
prohibition against ex post facto laws neatly dealt with the retroactivity problems inherent
in this scheme, but the British and American practices – and the narrow response to the
68
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practices reflected in the various ex post facto clauses – argue very strongly against the
existence of any kind of tradition of post-enactment notice that could form the foundation
for a due process challenge.72
Accordingly, the general rule for the legal effectiveness of statutes in the late
eighteenth century was quite clear: statutes were deemed operative from the moment that
they came into existence unless the provisions themselves contained a different effective
date.
d. The Constitution

Thus, with respect to every major governmental instrument that was available as a
model in the late eighteenth century, the rule respecting effectiveness was the same: such
instruments take effect from the moment of their adoption unless there is some provision
that says otherwise.73 And where provisions say otherwise, the delay in effectiveness can
be partial. Legal instruments need not be effective or ineffective in toto at any particular
moment in time.
Nothing in the Constitution categorically delays its effectiveness. On the
contrary, Article VII strongly indicates that ratification (adoption) is enough for the
“Establishment” of the Constitution. So why doesn’t that mean that the whole document
took effect immediately in the summer of 1788? The simple answer is that some
provisions were incapable of taking effect immediately because they required action by
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governmental actors who did not yet exist. Although the Constitution could have
expressly provided for a transitional period, as did many of the contemporaneous state
constitutions, its failure to do so poses no great problem for originalist textualists. Even
the most ardent textualist (and at least one of the present authors fits that description quite
nicely) will agree that inferences from a document’s structure and context are permissible
interpretative tools. If it is obvious on the face of a legal instrument that its effective
date, or the effective date of at least part of the instrument, must be at some point in the
future, one should give effect to that obvious meaning. It is clear that the Constitution,
even without saying so expressly, contemplates that its provisions for legislative and
executive action do not take effect until appropriate steps have been taken to put the new
government into place. This also means that the pre-existing authorities, such as the
institutions created by the Articles of Confederation, were not immediately displaced by
ratification of the new Constitution. The machinery of the old regime could continue
until the machinery of the new regime was in place.
But those considerations apply only to the parts of the Constitution that, by
necessary inference, carry an implied effective date that goes beyond the moment of
ratification. Provisions that are eminently capable of taking effect upon ratification, such
as the selection provisions for members of Congress and presidential electors and the
article I, section 10 restraints on state power, such as the Contracts Clause, do take effect
immediately. An implication from necessity only goes as far as the necessity requires.
There remains only the task of determining when the Constitution was ratified and
its self-executing provisions immediately took effect. Although it is possible to argue
that a “Ratification” isn’t really a “Ratification” until it has been verified by some official
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authority, the straightforward answer appears to be the correct one: the Constitution was
properly ratified when the necessary ninth state convention completed its work, which in
this case was 1:00 P.M. on June 21, 1788. All subsequent events, such as notification to
Congress and the other states and verification by Congress of the authenticity of the
ratifying documents, merely communicate or give evidence of the relevant event. Just as
a statute or treaty binds even those who do not (and cannot) know about its adoption, the
ninth ratification of the Constitution was legally effective without regard to the extent to
which that adoption was communicated to the world. The Contracts Clause of the
Constitution, and all other provisions that were capable of taking effect upon adoption of
the Constitution, became effective on June 21, 1788. When Chief Justice Marshall said
otherwise, he was simply wrong.

3. Lessons from the Founders?

Our argument thus far is based on the straightforward text of Article VII and
inferences from the founding era’s treatment of similar legal instruments. What about
direct evidence of the original understanding of the effect of New Hampshire’s
ratification? What did people say about the legal effectiveness of the Constitution in the
summer of 1788? Didn’t the Virginia legislature, for instance, make a very powerful
statement when it passed a law divesting Owings of his land after Virginia had ratified
the Constitution?
There are two kinds of answers to these obvious queries: interpretative and
substantive. The interpretative answer threatens to take us far afield and can be treated
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here only briefly: so-called direct evidence of constitutional meaning, consisting of
statements of informed individuals made during the relevant events, is not really as direct
as is commonly thought. If one is looking for the actual intentions or understandings –
the mental states – of persons who lived during the founding era, their recorded
statements are good (even if not conclusive) evidence of those intentions. But we do not
regard the search for original meaning as a search for historically concrete
understandings. Instead, we conceive of the inquiry in hypothetical terms: what would a
fully informed public audience, in possession of all relevant information about the
Constitution and the world around it, have understood the Constitution to mean?
Although evidence of actual mental states is admissible and relevant to prove
constitutional meaning in this sense –after all, one cannot really know what a
hypothetical audience would have thought at a particular time without knowing
something about what real audiences actually thought -- it is not conclusive, and often is
not even the best available evidence. Actual mental states may not reflect actual meaning
if people did not fully understand certain important features of the Constitution or the
world. That is why arguments from text, structure, and general background
understandings are, in general, more powerful than arguments from historical authority –
not because of any problems of discovering, reconciling, and aggregating intentions
(though these are real problems), but because of the nature of original meaning.74
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At the substantive level, even if one is interested in historical commentary on the
legal status of the Constitution in 1788, one is likely to be disappointed. The simple fact
is that people were not thinking much about the legal effect of New Hampshire’s
ratification in the summer of 1788. Attention was focussed on the concrete problems of
putting together a functioning union. New Hampshire was a minor player in this drama.
The lead actors were Virginia and New York, with North Carolina playing a supporting
role.75 To put it bluntly, no one much cared if there was a new federal union of nine
states if Virginia and New York did not sign on. A fairly typical comment – perhaps
especially pointed for its objectivity – came from the French minister plenipotentiary,
who upon learning of New Hampshire’s ratification wrote that “without Virginia and
Newyork the new Government will exist more in name than in fact.”76 Ezra Stiles said
virtually the same thing in his diary: “Adoption of the new foederal Constitution by the
State of New Hampshire . . . . So now the new Constitution is ratified, i.e., literally – but
if N York, Virga. & No Caro should not accede, it will yet be some time before the
Ratification may be considered as completely established.”77 This was no doubt the
general sentiment: even if, in some legalistic sense, the Constitution was now ratified as
law, the union would be of little practical use without the remaining big states. The legal
effectiveness of the Constitution simply was not the major issue of the day.78 That role
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was filled by the attempt to get New York and Virginia on board. To the extent that
people talked about the New Hampshire ratification, it was largely in the context of its
potential effect on the conventions in other states. As another French observer astutely
put it, “[New Hampshire’s] Ratification is enough for the Establishment of the new
Constitution . . . . But it is believed that Congress, before joining together the nine States
in the new Confederation, is waiting until Virginia, North Carolina and New-York,
whose conventions are now assembled, have adopted or rejected the proposed
Constitution.”79 Even after Virginia joined the union, George Washington was still
focussed on the practical need to bring the other states into the fold.80
In short, the purely legal question that we address here, and that Chief Justice
Marshall faced in Owings v. Speed, was not a question that people were asking, much
less answering, in the summer of 1788.81 Their attention was directed to the more

McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States 202 (1935) (“The New Hampshire
convention . . . adopted the Constitution, June 21, 1788. But the all-important states of New York and
Virginia were still in doubt.”); Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union 1781-1789, at 312 (1987)
(“Although New Hampshire, the ninth state, ratified the Constitution four days ahead of Virginia, thus
putting the charter into effect, a key battle remained to be waged to attach New York to the Union.
Without New York the nation would remain split asunder”) (emphasis added).
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Letter from Phillipe Andre Joseph de Letombe to Comte de la Luzerne, June 26, 1788 (reprinted in id.
at 194, 195).
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See Letter from George Washington to Charles Coteworth Pinckney, June 28, 1788 (reprinted in id. at
207).
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If one must have an obligatory contemporaneous document, the most relevant discussion that we have
found is in two letters from Tenche Coxe and Nalbo Frazier to some merchants in Barbados. On July 10,
1788, Coxe and Frazier wrote that “the affairs of this Country are now placed upon a safe & promising
footing by the Adoption of the New Constitution[.] [I]t is binding on the ten States that have adopted . . . .”
Letter from Tenche Coxe & Nalbo Frazier to James O’Neal, July 10, 1788 (reprinted in id. at 255)
(emphasis added). On July 11, they wrote:
. . . The various foreign Gentlemen connected in the American Trade will have great safety
hereafter in their Connexions with this County from the final Adoption & ratification of the new
form of Government. No papers tenders & no law impairing or staying the execution of Contracts
can hereafter take place, and our State courts will not have to determine between foreigners & us;
but an impartial federal Court[.]
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immediately practical problems of putting together a nation. A legal union was not
necessarily a functioning union. Nine states may have been enough to establish the
Constitution, but if New York and Virginia were not among them, they were not enough
to fulfill the objectives of unification.
The founding generation can be forgiven for not paying attention to the legal
niceties of the effect of ratification. We now have the luxury of time and hindsight. So
did Chief Justice Marshall, which makes his decision in Owings all the less excusable.

D. If One Government Wasn’t Bad Enough . . .

Chief Justice Marshall’s argument in Owings boils down to the single statement
that the constitutional government and the government under the Articles of
Confederation “could not be understood to exist at the same time.”82 Because the
government under the Articles continued to exist after the decisive ninth ratification -how else could it verify the ratifications and fix dates for the session of the new Congress
and for the selection of presidential electors? – and indeed continued to exist “potentially
until . . . the day preceding that on which the members of the new Congress were directed

Letter from Tenche Coxe & Nalbo Frazier to Stephen Blackett, July 11, 1788 (reprinted in id. at 255-56)
(emphasis added). Taken out of context, the emphasized portions could be taken to suggest that the authors
understood the Constitution’s prohibitions on states to be immediately effective. But the subsequent
reference to federal courts, which clearly could not operate until the machinery of the new government was
in place, indicates that authors were not focussing on the possible differential effects of various
constitutional provisions. Thus, aside from any questions about how much weight to attach to private
commercial correspondence – even from so notable a figure as Tenche Coxe – there is no indication that
anyone was thinking directly about the effective date of the Article I, section 10 prohibitions on states.
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18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 422.
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to assemble,”83 the new constitutional government could not possibly be said to exist
until the new Congress met.
Taken at face value, this is a very peculiar position. The new government clearly
could not exercise legislative, executive, or judicial authority until it had legislative,
executive, and judicial personnel capable of carrying those powers into effect. Had the
Constitution been nothing but the structural blueprint for a new set of federal institutions,
Marshall’s point might have some force. But the Constitution was obviously more than
that. It was also a denial of state power in certain important respects. There is nothing
illogical about the simultaneous existence of the governmental institutions under the
Articles and the prohibitions on state action contained in the Constitution.84 And that, as
we have seen, is precisely what the best understanding of the Constitution’s effectiveness
requires. Marshall’s all-or-nothing view of constitutional effectiveness is simply
unwarranted.
It is hard to resist another response to Marshall as well. The idea that there is
something logically impossible about two governments existing simultaneously over the
same territory is, to say the least, strange coming from a Federalist judge. Any federal
system that does not absolutely separate the realms of authority of the national and local
governments presents this picture of overlapping sovereigns. Of course, any such regime
requires conflict-of-laws norms to resolve jurisdictional disputes, but the idea that you
cannot have two governments that both have some measure of authority over a territory is
just silly. Moreover, this notion of overlapping jurisdiction is familiar from international
83

Id.
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Indeed, many of the Constitution’s prohibitions on state action were foreshadowed by similar
prohibitions in the Articles of Confederation.
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law. As Marshall himself wrote in United States v. Rice in 1820,85 the occupancy of
foreign territory during wartime gives the occupying nation a right to administer the
territory, but does not make the occupied territory a formal part of the administering
nation. The scheme of private rights that pre-existed the occupation continues until
changed in accordance with appropriate domestic and international norms. And although
the public institutions of governance of the occupied nations are immediately displaced
upon occupation, those institutions do not disappear. If the occupying nation leaves
without permanently acquiring the territory through cession, the original sovereign does
not need to re-create all of its prior institutions of government; they simply laid dormant
until the end of the occupation. In a very real sense, wartime occupation of territory
involves overlapping governments.
It is doubtful that Marshall really meant something as silly as the proposition that
there cannot ever be overlapping governments. Perhaps he had in mind something more
functional: in the absence of the institutional machinery of the new constitutional
government, who would enforce the “self-executing” prohibitions, such as the Contracts
Clause? Until federal judges were appointed, there were no federal courts. Until a
Congress and President were selected, there could be no federal enforcement mechanism
for any constitutional provisions. If, as modern positivists will doubtless insist, there
cannot be any legal rights without corresponding remedies,86 what can it mean to say that
the Constitution created legal rights and obligations in the summer of 1788?
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See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 541, 579 (2000) (“as a central tenet of his jurisprudence, Llewellyn
believed that people only had legal rights to the extent that the law provided them remedies”).
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A full treatment of the issues lurking behind this seemingly simple objection
would require a separate article, but a few remarks will be sufficient for our purposes
here. The simplest answer is that an enforcement mechanism for constitutional violations
was indeed in place in 1788. Article VI of the Constitution provides that “[t]his
Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”87 State courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, were
therefore bound to apply federal constitutional rules in cases to which they apply as soon
as the Constitution became effective. It is true that federal courts would not sit in
superintendence of state decisions until sometime in 1789, but even after the federal
personnel were in place, state courts were expected to be the front-line defense against
many constitutional violations, including violations by their own states.88 Thus, the
necessary governmental apparatus to enforce the Constitution was in place on June 21,
1788.
Even if one will settle for nothing but a federal enforcement mechanism, it is still
meaningful to say that the Constitution became law when it was ratified. It was evident
in 1788 that the new government would be up and running in relatively short order. A
potential plaintiff in 1788 had only to wait for the appropriate machinery of federal
governance to be in place in order to raise constitutional claims. There is nothing absurd
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That is not to say that the founding generation unanimously expected state courts to entertain all
possible cases arising under the Constitution. See Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties,
and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 39, 52-78. But to the extent that there were thought
to be “enclaves” of exclusive federal jurisdiction, claims under the Contracts Clause were unlikely
candidates. See id. at 78-105 (discussing the types of cases for which the arguments for exclusive federal
jurisdiction were most prominent).

38

about a scheme in which rights are established at one time and the remedies are provided
at another. Justice delayed is not – or at least is not always -- justice denied; it is justice
delayed. The delay may be inconvenient, hurtful, and occasionally fatal, but conceptually
one can hold fast to the notion that rights must have remedies, and even to the notion that
federal rights must have federal remedies, and still conclude that the Constitution became
law in 1788.
Moreover, the idea that legal rights could not exist without an external
enforcement mechanism is hard to square with the founding-era acceptance of
international law. The Constitution, of course, expressly recognizes the “law of
nations”89 as a distinct legal category, and founding-era documents and early cases are
filled with references to the law of nations as a robust source of authority.90 Indeed, in
1819, Congress went so far as to criminalize “piracy, as defined by the law of nations.”91
There was (and is) obviously no legal enforcement mechanism external to the United
States whose function was to enforce the law of nations. That did not prevent eighteenthcentury thinkers from viewing it as law. Nor did the (short-term) absence of federal
enforcement machinery prevent the federal Constitution from having the status of law
prior to the Spring of 1789.
Underlying this concern about rights and remedies is the slippery concept of
sovereignty. Who was the sovereign in the United States on June 21, 1788? To what
89

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (giving Congress power “[t]o define and punish . . . Offences against
the Law of Nations”).
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See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 819
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Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14. The statute was upheld (over a vigorous dissent)
as a constitutional exercise of the power to “define” the offense of piracy. See United States v. Smith, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
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extent was that sovereign’s power defined by the Constitution? Can one speak of a
document as “sovereign,” or can that term be applied only to a concrete set of human
institutions? These are questions for another day. For now, it is enough to note that the
concept of sovereignty was undergoing a revolution in eighteenth-century America that
may dwarf the role of the written Constitution as a distinctively American contribution to
political theory. If sovereignty is not a single brute fact, but is instead a complex
interplay among sometimes complementary and sometimes competing human
institutions, then that understanding harmonizes well with the notion of a constitution that
is, at a particular moment in time, partially effective and partially ineffective. The legal
status – or, rather, the legal statuses – of the Constitution in the summer of 1788 may thus
provide insight into some very deep questions of governance that are at the heart of the
American revolutionary political experience.

II.

THIS LAND IS WHOSE LAND?

Ill-defined speculations about deep political theory aside, why would anyone
today care about such arcane matters as the “true” effective date of the Constitution? The
fate of a good portion of upstate New York, however, turned on the question a mere two
decades ago, and the Supreme Court’s wrong answer in 1820 had major consequences.
One suspects that a correct understanding of the Constitution’s effective date would not –
and perhaps should not -- have altered the outcome in that case, but we will never know.
In the 1780s, the Oneida Indian Nation was in possession of more than five
million acres of land in central New York State. The State wanted the land. On June 23,
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1785, the Oneidas were induced -- allegedly by threats from the state Governor to refuse
to protect their lands from trespasses -- to sign a treaty selling 300,000 acres of their
territory to the State. On September 22, 1788, New York procured another treaty with
the Oneidas -- this time allegedly by fraud and misrepresentation -- for the remaining
lands. 92
Two hundred years later, the Oneidas sued to recover their property.93 The
primary substantive issue in the case involved whether the Articles of Confederation
disabled the states from entering into treaties with Indians.94 After considerable effort,
the federal courts concluded that the Articles did not invalidate the transactions.95 We
accept that conclusion here without examining it. Our concern is with a different
argument that received almost no attention.
The Treaty of Fort Schuyler, which transferred the vast bulk of the land in
question to the state of New York, was signed on September 22, 1788. New Hampshire
became the ninth state to ratify the federal Constitution on June 21, 1788. New York
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See Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. State of New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1083-84 (2d Cir. 1982).

94

The case also presented a host of issues concerning jurisdiction, justiciability, and remedies that are not
relevant here For a discussion of some of the remedial issues, see Joshua N. Lief, Note, The Oneida Land
Claims: Equity and Ejectment, 39 Syracuse. L. Rev. 825 (1988).
95

It took four decisions to finalize that conclusions: the original district court decision rejecting the
claims, see Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. State of New York, 520 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D.N.Y. 1981);
a court of appeals decision remanding for further consideration, see Oneida Indian Nation of New York v.
State of New York, 691 F.2d 1070 (2d Cir. 1982); a second district court decision reaffirming the original
disposition, see Oneida Indian Nation v. State of New York, 649 F. Supp. 420 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); and the
final affirmance by the Second Circuit, see Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. State of New York, 860
F.2d 1145 (2d. Cir. 1988).

41

added its ratification on July 26, 1788. Thus, when the Treaty of Fort Schuyler was
signed, New York was officially part of the new federal union.
The Constitution prescribes that “[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance,
or Confederation.”96 The President and Senate have the exclusive power to make treaties
under the Constitution.97 Although the Articles of Confederation also restricted the
power of states to enter into treaties,98 those restrictions were substantially more limited
than those provided in the federal Constitution.99 It was taken for granted in the Oneida
litigation that federal power to enter into treaties with Indians was plenary and exclusive
under the Constitution.100 Thus, assuming that the constitutional term “Treaty” includes
agreements with Indian tribes,101 and assuming that the Constitution was in effect when
96
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or foreign state”).
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Intercourse Act required merely that such sales “be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held
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the Treaty of Fort Schuyler was signed, it would appear that New York had no power to
enter into the treaty in 1788.
The Oneidas advanced this argument in 1981, and it was casually dismissed by
the District Court on the strength of Owings v. Speed:
Crucial to the plaintiffs’ argument is their assertion that the Constitution
was in effect on September 22, 1788, the date on which the Treaty was concluded.
The plaintiffs contend that the Constitution became effective after ratification by
the ninth State on June 21, 1788, with New York ratifying in July of 1788.
However, the Supreme Court long ago concluded otherwise in a case in
which the issue was whether the provisions of the Constitution applied to acts of
state legislatures in 1788 . . . .
The Court in Owings ruled that the Constitution did not become operative
until the first Wednesday in March of 1789, the date set by resolution of the old
government. Therefore, plaintiffs’ claims under the Constitution must fail.102
The issue does not appear in any subsequent decision involving the Oneidas’ claims; the
plaintiffs presumably (and quite reasonably) abandoned it once the court invoked
Owings.
The clause prohibiting the states from entering into treaties, however, surely went
into effective upon ratification of the Constitution. The clause does not require any
federal legislative or executive action for its implementation; it is a straightforward denial
of state power.103 Accordingly, as of June 21, 1788, no state that ratified the Constitution

under the authority of the United States.” Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (emphasis
added). The word “at” indicates that the term “treaty” in the 1790 act merely meant a public meeting of
some kind – a usage that was not uncommon in the eighteenth century. See Kendrick-Hands, supra, at 81617 & n.153. If, however, Indian treaties were not treaties in the constitutional sense, then Congress had no
authority in 1793 to require their use – as it has done for the past 200 years. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994)
(“No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian
nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or
convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution.”). Congress cannot make something a constitutional
“treaty” if it doesn’t already fit the description.
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The District Court, echoing the thoughts of Ms. Kendrick-Hands, see Kendrick-Hands, supra note XX,
at 836-37, suggested that federal legislation was necessary in order to deprive the states of their right to
acquire title to Indian lands. See 520 F. Supp. at 1323 n.45. This makes sense, however, only if
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could enter into a treaty. When New York ratified the Constitution on July 26, 1788, it
thereby surrendered its power to make treaties. Even if, as the federal courts held in the
Oneida litigation, the Articles of Confederation did not disable the states from purchasing
land from Indians through treaties, those states that ratified the Constitution bound
themselves to the document’s prohibitions, including the prohibition on treaties. As far
as the ratifying states were concerned, the government under the Articles had the
exclusive right to enter into treaties with Indians until the new federal government had a
functioning President and Senate (and perhaps a functioning House of Representatives to
the extent that treaties were not self-executing).104 Accordingly, the Treaty of Fort
Schuyler was palpably illegal.
Perhaps concerns about justiciability or remedies would, and should, have
ultimately prevented the Oneidas from reclaiming their land. Perhaps there may even
have been a way for New York validly to have purchased the land through some
mechanism other than a treaty. We have no considered opinion on these subjects. But
surely the Oneidas’ arguments deserved more consideration than Chief Justice Marshall’s
ancient blunder permitted.
agreements with Indians are not “treaties” in the constitutional sense. The prohibition on state treaties is
part of a single clause that contains most of the original Constitution’s denials of state power. See U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender
in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.”). The Treaty or Alliance Clause no more requires federal
legislative implementation than does the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Contracts Clause, or the Titles of
Nobility Clause. If the state can acquire Indian title through some means other than a treaty, that is a
different matter. But there is little to be said for the view that that Treaty or Alliance Clause is not selfexecuting.
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III.

THE MARSHALL PLAN

John Marshall was a smart man. He seldom acted in a major way without an
agenda and without a keen eye for consequences. How could he make such an obvious
mistake in Owings about something as basic as the effective date of the Constitution?
It is possible, of course, that neither he nor anyone else thought of Owings as a
major case. Perhaps the decision was tossed off hurriedly (it certainly reads as though it
was hastily written), and no one gave the matter any serious thought. One should at least
entertain the idea, however, that Marshall knew exactly what he was doing.
What would have happened (other than the restoration of Owings’ possession of
his land) had Marshall ruled in favor of Owings? By March 4, 1789, everyone had had a
chance to get used to the idea of the new federal government. Elections had been held,
and the changing of the guard from the Articles to the Constitution was complete. State
legislatures, in particular, were certainly aware by that time that the Article I, section 10
prohibitions needed to be obeyed. Was that really true before that date? If the
Constitution became effective for nine states as of June 21, 1788 (and as of the date of
their ratifications for Virginia and New York), then the Article I, section 10 prohibitions
were legal norms as of that date. They thus bound states that may not even have been
aware of the decisive ninth ratification for some time. And as evidenced by the Virginia
statute in Owings, even after ratification states were not necessarily acting under the
impression that they were bound by the Constitution’s restrictions.105 It is possible that
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Is that not strong evidence of a public understanding that the Constitution was not, in any sense,
effective until (at least) March 4, 1789? It is perhaps evidence, but not strong evidence. Everyone treated
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many land titles beyond Owings’ could be called into question by a holding that the
Contracts Clause was in effect from the moment of ratification. The disruptive
consequences of a judgment for Owings might be significant.
More to the point, the Constitution also declares that “[n]o State shall . . . emit
Bills of Credit [or] make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of
Debts.”106 Were all of the ratifying states in compliance with these provisions from June
21, 1788 on? The point is not whether they were or were not. We do not know. Neither,
we suspect, did John Marshall in 1820. But if states were in fact (so Marshall could at
least imagine) issuing paper money in various forms between the summer of 1788 and the
spring of 1789, what would be the consequences in 1820 of reaching back 30 years to
undo at least some of those transactions? Perhaps most of those claims would be timebarred. Perhaps the effect of holding the Constitution to be in effect from ratification
would be minimal. Perhaps there were in fact no transactions to undo. But why (from
Marshall’s perspective) risk it when a simple resolution, with a clearly drawn line, is
readily at hand? And it is all the more attractive because the rule works in favor of state
legislation. Just one year after McCulloch v. Maryland,107 did it really make sense to
drop another potential bomb on the states, with hard-to-foresee consequences?
We have no way to know whether any of this speculation even remotely rings
true. But if it is at all close to the mark, there is an interesting convergence between
Owings and the Oneida cases. The strict question of the legal rights of the Oneida Nation
the selection provisions for the staffing of the new government as being effective from the moment of
ratification. There is no good distinction between those provisions and the Article I, section 10
prohibitions. If Virginia legislators thought otherwise, that was (or should have been) their misfortune.
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clearly took a back seat to more practical problems of remedies: what would happen if
five million acres of land in New York suddenly had to change hands after 200 years?
No one, I trust, seriously expected the federal courts to hand over New York to the
Oneida Nation, no matter how compelling their claims might be in terms of law and
justice – just as Chief Justice Marshall, three years after Owings, was not about to declare
the European occupation of North America to have been illegal.108 Judges can practice
legal nullification just as effectively as can juries. We have elsewhere discussed at length
another context in which the prospect of unsettling existing legal relations induced the
Supreme Court (and the United States executive department) to adopt legal positions of
dazzling absurdity.109 We do not mean to endorse that practice. Quite to the contrary, we
think it the job of scholars, or at least our job, to pursue knowledge as objectively and
dispassionately as possible. What others do with that knowledge is beyond our control.
The Constitution became law over a period of time beginning on June 21, 1788.
That conclusion may be inconvenient in some respects (not the least of which is the
awkwardness of encyclopedia entries on the effective date of the Constitution), but it is
right.
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